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Abstract—The broadcast nature of wireless communications
imposes the risk of information leakage to adversarial users or
unauthorized receivers. Therefore, information security between
intended users remains a challenging issue. Most of the current
physical layer security techniques exploit channel randomness as
a common source between two legitimate nodes to extract a secret
key. In this paper, we propose a new simple technique to generate
the secret key. Specifically, we exploit the estimated channel to
generate a secondary random process (SRP) that is common
between the two legitimate nodes. We compare the estimated
channel gain and phase to a preset threshold. The moving
differences between the locations at which the estimated channel
gain and phase exceed the threshold are the realization of our
SRP. We simulate an orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
(OFDM) system and show that our proposed technique provides a
drastic improvement in the key bit mismatch rate (BMR) between
the legitimate nodes when compared to the techniques that exploit
the estimated channel gain or phase directly. In addition to that,
the secret key generated through our technique is longer than
that generated by conventional techniques.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, Secret key generation,
Bit mismatch rate, Channel estimation, OFDM systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) is a
multi-carrier modulation scheme that has been widely adopted
in many wireless communication system such as Long Term
Evolution (LTE) systems [1]. It provides many advantages over
the single-carrier modulation schemes, including : high data
rate, immunity to selective fading, resilience to inter-symbol
interference and higher spectrum efficiency [2].
As in any wireless communication system, security of
OFDM wireless system is a critical issue. Currently, security
relies on cryptographic techniques and protocols that lie at
the upper layers of the wireless network. One main draw-
back of these solutions is the necessity of a complex key
management scheme in the case of symmetric ciphers and
high computational complexity in the case of asymmetric
ciphers. On the other hand, physical layer security relies on
the randomness of the communication channel and has a much
lower computational complexity.
Within the paradigm of physical layer security, typically a
physical layer specific characteristic is used as key generator to
guarantee information hiding from eavesdroppers. Such tech-
niques are based on channel reciprocity assumption. When two
antennas communicate by radiating the same signal through
a linear and isotropic channel, the received signals by each
antenna will be identical. This is due to the reciprocity of the
radiating and receiving antenna pattern [3], [4].
In [5]–[8], channel measurements were exploited to solve
the problem of secret key generation (SKG). In [5] the
authors observed that the maximum size of the generated
secret key mainly depends on the mutual information between
the channel estimates at the two legitimate nodes. They also
derived an expression for the mutual information for a general
multipath channel. The most common feature of the channel
characteristics that is widely used is channel gain, mainly
because of its ease of implementation [7], [9]. Others exploit
the channel phase to generate the secret key as in [10], [11].
Unlike channel gain, channel phase is uniformly distributed
in narrowband fading channels. The authors in [10] were able
to generate a long key as compared to the conventional cryp-
tographic techniques from the estimated channel phase, while
in [11], they extend their system to the use of relay nodes.
Exploiting the channel estimates to generate a secret key has
also been investigated under multiple antenna scenarios [12]
and relaying scenarios [13].
In [9], [14], the authors presented a popular technique to
extract a secret key that is based on level crossing of the
estimated channel gain. The main advantage of their level
crossing techniques is that it achieves a low bit mismatch rate
(BMR) between the key generated at the legitimate nodes. The
authors studied the channel probing rate effect on the secret
key rate for different doppler shifts. They found that secret
key rate increases as the probing rate increases and saturates
at 20 KHz probing rate for the worst case doppler shift they
assumed. The smaller the doppler shift the smaller the probing
rate required to saturate the secret key rate. In [7], the authors
observed that as the carrier frequency increases, the probing
rate should increase to achieve a suitable key rate. This is
mainly because the channel temporal variation increases at
higher carrier frequencies.
One main advantage of exploiting channel estimates to gen-
erate the secret key is its high key generation rate. However,
a main drawback of exploiting the channel reciprocity to
generate secret keys is that the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at both receivers affects the reciprocity of the channel
measurements [15]. This drawback causes the BMR between
the legitimate nodes to rise, which affects the operation of the
SKG based on channel estimates at low and medium signal to
noise ratio (SNR) scenarios.
In this paper, we propose a robust technique to generate
the secret key which we apply on the estimated channel gain
only, channel phase only and combined gain and phase, which
enhances the performance of the SKG system at low and
medium SNR levels. In our technique, the estimated channel
is considered our primary random process, from which we
derive a secondary random process (SRP) that is then used to
generate the secret key. The primary random process, which
is either the estimated channel gain or phase, is compared to
a preset threshold. The locations of the realizations at which
the primary random process exceeds the threshold are stored.
The moving increments, which is the difference between
each two adjacent locations, are the realizations of our SRP.
Those realizations are then used to generate the secret key.
Our proposed technique improves the BMR drastically and
achieves a longer key length than the conventional techniques.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
II the system model is presented. Related existing techniques
are addressed in Section III. Our proposed channel SRP for
SKG technique is presented in Section IV. We evaluate the
performance of our solution in Section V. The paper is then
concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume that there exist two legitimate nodes, named
Alice and Bob, trying to secure a communicating link, and
that each of them used OFDM for transmission/reception.
In particular, consider an OFDM system where each OFDM
symbol consists of N orthogonal subcarriers. After modulating
the input serial data streams, a serial to parallel converter
converts serial data symbols to N parallel streams, resulting
in X[k] for k = 0, 1, ..., N − 1. We assume that Np pilots are
inserted for the measurement of channel conditions yielding
Xp for p = 1, ..., Np. The vector X[k] is then used as input to
an N-point Inverse Fast Fourier Transform (IFFT). The time
domain signal is now:
x[n] = IFFT {X[k]} n = 0, 1, 2, N − 1. (1)
A guard interval of length Ng , also known as cyclic prefix is
appended according to:
xf [n] =
{
x[n+N ], n = Ng,−Ng + 1, ...,−1,
x[n], n = 0, 1, .., N − 1. (2)
xf [n] is then passed through a parallel to serial converter and
digital to analog converter, which is then transmitted to the
other node. The received signal, as exchanged between Alice
and Bob, can be given by:
yAf = x
B
f [n]⊗ h[n] + wA[n], (3)
yBf = x
A
f [n]⊗ h[n] + wB [n], (4)
where xBf is the transmitted signal from Bob to Alice, x
A
f
is the transmitted signal from Alice to Bob, h is a random
process that describes the wireless channel between Alice and
Bob and wA and wB are the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at Alice and Bob’s receivers, respectively. Note that
the pilots, also known as training signals or reference signal,
within xAf and x
B
f are identical. The guard interval is then
removed from the received signal yielding y[n] = yf [n] for
n = 0, 1, ..., N − 1. y[n] is then passed through an N-point
FFT yielding the frequency domain signal Y [k] = FFT{y[n]}
k = 0, 1, ..., N − 1. The pilots, whose locations are already
known, are then extracted from Y [k] yielding Yp, where p =
1, ..., Np. Note that the signal exchange between Alice and
Bob is performed during the coherence time of the channel.
For simplicity, we estimate the channel through the least
squares (LS) estimator in the frequency domain. The LS
estimator minimizes the squared error as [16]:
Hˆ = argmin ||Yp −XpH||. (5)
The estimated channel at both Alice and Bob can be given by:
HˆALS =
(
XHp Xp
)−1
XHp Y
A
p , (6)
HˆBLS =
(
XHp Xp
)−1
XHp Y
B
p , (7)
where (.)H denotes the Hermitian operation. The estimated
channel at the pilot locations are then interpolated to estimate
the channel across the entire OFDM symbol. The estimated
channel gains at Alice and Bob |HˆALS | and |HˆBLS | as well as
the phases, which are the angles of HˆALS and Hˆ
B
LS , are the
common sources of randomness which are typically used to
generate the secret key and from which we will derive our
SRP.
In our adversary model, we assume that an eavesdropper
(Eve) can listen to all the communications between the two
trusted communicating nodes (Alice) and (Bob). However,
Eve can estimate the channel between itself and both Alice
and Bob. Eve can not be within a few wavelength near to
either Alice or Bob, which ensures that her estimated channel
between either of them is independent of that between Alice
and Bob. We assume that Eve is a passive adversary.
III. EXISTING TECHNIQUES
The most typical steps employed in SKG techniques are
presented in Figure 1. In the first step, Alice and Bob exchange
beacon signals, from which each estimates the physical layer
characteristics that are used as common source of randomness.
In our case, they estimate the channel gain or phase. The chan-
nel measurements are then quantized and converted into stream
of bits. This is followed by an information reconciliation as
well as a privacy amplification step to be applied at the two
streams of bits.
Although uniform quantization is easy to implement, in-
creasing the quantization bit number dramatically degrades
the performance of the technique since the BMR between
the Alice and Bob increases. In [8], an encoding algorithm
is proposed to tackle this problem where each uniformly
quantized value is encoded with multiple values. It is worth
noting that a lower BMR after the quantization step leads to
a longer key, which increases the technique’s efficiency.
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Fig. 1: Typical steps for SKG
Another popular technique to address the BMR is presented
in [9], [14]. Their solution is based on level crossing of the
estimated channel gain. They first use the statistics of the
estimated channel gain to compute two thresholds (q+ and
q−). Alice determines the locations of her estimated channel
gain, which is stored in a vector LA, that are above q+ or
below q− for a duration of m successive estimates. Alice then
sends those locations to Bob. Bob then compares his estimated
channel gain at the locations in LA to determine LB at which
the estimated channel gain are higher than q+ or below q−
for a duration of m− 1 successive estimates. Bob’s estimated
locations LB , which is a subset of LA are sent back to Alice.
The channel estimates at the locations LB at both Alice and
Bob are then quantized and converted into bitstreams. The
main difference between the level crossing technique and the
traditional techniques is that the information reconciliation
step is performed before the quantization and the bitstream
generation. This leads to a much better BMR but at the cost
of much shorter key length. To address this drawback, the
authors of [9], [14] have proposed to increase the propping
rate of the channel.
IV. PROPOSED SRP TECHNIQUE
We propose a simple SKG technique exploiting, indirectly,
the estimated channel. Our technique can be applied on the
channel gain only, phase only or a combination of the channel
gain and phase as we will show later. It is assumed that Alice
and Bob have exchanged signals within the coherence time
of the channel. They then have estimated the channel using
(7). They applied an interpolation technique on their channel
estimates at the pilot locations to estimate the channel across
the entire OFDM symbol. It is worth noting that our technique
is not exclusive to OFDM systems, rather it can be applied on
the estimated channel in presence of any other system.
A. Creating a secondary random process
Due to the reciprocity of the channel, the channel estimates
at Alice and Bob, HˆALS and Hˆ
B
LS , are supposed to be identical.
However, because of the AWGN added at the two receivers,
HˆALS and Hˆ
B
LS are not identical. To address the BMR issue
explained earlier, we generate a secondary random process
from the channel estimates. This SRP is then used as common
source of randomness to generate the secret key. The steps
which can be applied on the estimated channel gain or phase,
are reported below. The steps are reported for the channel gain
and apply similarly to the phase. For simplicity, we limit the
description below to the case in which they are applied to the
estimated channel gain. The steps to generate our SRP are:
1) Both Alice and Bob use their estimated channel gain to
estimate a threshold (γg) as:
γAg = E[|HˆALS |] + αstd(|HˆALS |) (8)
γBg = E[|HˆBLS |] + αstd(|HˆBLS |), (9)
where E[.] is the mean operation, std(.) is the standard
deviation operation and α is a design parameter ∈ [−1 :
1].
2) Both Alice and Bob compare their channel gain, recur-
sively to the preset threshold γg .
3) If the channel estimate is higher than the preset threshold,
the location, i.e, the index (x-axis) is stored in a vector
S initialized to all zeros. Both Alice and Bob estimate
their vectors as SAg and SBg .
4) Both Alice and Bob then estimate the moving increment
of their estimated locations JAg and JBg for channel gain,
which are computed as:
JAg [i] = S
A
g [i+ 1]− SAg [i], i = 1, ..., N − 1, (10)
JBg [i] = S
B
g [i+ 1]− SBg [i], i = 1, ..., N − 1. (11)
The realizations in the vectors JAg and JBg constitute the
realizations of our secondary random process. In other words,
we have created two SRPs, one for the channel gain and
another for the channel phase. These SRPs are considered our
new common sources of randomness which are then used by
Alice and Bob to generate the secret key. In V, we provide
an example of our SRP. Alice and Bob can use SRP extracted
from channel gain only, channel phase only or a combination
of the two for the SKG.
B. Quantization
Now that we have our secondary common sources of
randomness estimated at both Alice and Bob, the next step is to
convert them into a bit stream suitable for the SKG. The most
popular technique for quantization is the uniform quantization.
In the uniform quantization, the spaces along the x-axis is
uniformly distributed. Similarly for the spaces in the y-axis,
i.e., the estimated secondary common source of randomness.
When using nq bits as the number of quantization bits, there
will exist 2nq levels to quantize the common sources of
randomness. The quantized decimal valued are then converted
into bits.
C. Information Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification
The generated bit streams at Alice and Bob might have
some discrepancy, particularly at very low SNR levels. This is
due to several reasons such as interference, noise and hardware
limitations. A reconciliation protocol such as the one presented
in [17] will be used to minimize the discrepancy. Both Alice
and Bob first permute their bit streams in the same way. Then
they divide the permuted bit stream into small blocks. Alice
then sends permutations and parities of each block to Bob.
Bob compares the received parity information with the ones he
already processed. In case of a parity mismatch, Bob changes
his bits in this block to match the received ones.
Although information reconciliation protocol leaks mini-
mum information, the eavesdropper can still use this leaked
information to guess the rest of the secret key. Privacy amplifi-
cation solves this issue by reducing the length of the output bit
stream. The generated bit stream is shorter in length but higher
in entropy. To do so, both Alice and Bob apply a universal
hash function selected randomly from a set of hash functions
known by both Alice and Bob. Alice sends the number of the
selected hash function to Bob so that Bob can use the same
hash function.
Our SKG technique is summarized in Algorithm 1 for the
channel gain. It is assumed that Alice and Bob have already
estimated the channel. Same steps can be applied to the
channel phase.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of our technique, we simulate
an entire OFDM system and estimate the channel using the
LS estimator. Table I summarizes our simulation parameters
for the subsequent figures. We simulate the conventional
channel gain and phase techniques, level crossing technique,
and proposed SRP technique for channel gain only and for
channel phase only. Then we obtain the combined SRP by
concatenating bitstreams from SRP channel gain and phase.
TABLE I: Simulation parameters
Parameter Value
No. of subcarriers 1024
No. of FFT point 1024
Subcarrier spacing 15 KHz
Number of pilots 16.7%=171
Cyclic prefix length 25%=256
Modulation scheme QPSK
Channel type Rayleigh
Doppler shift 100 Hz
Chan. Estimation LS
Interpolation type Linear
α -0.2
m for Level crossing 4
nq 8 bits
Number of iterations 10000
Algorithm 1 Proposed SRP SKG Technique for Channel Gain
Step 1: Creating secondary random process
Alice and Bob estimate their thresholds using (8) and (9).
Both Alice and Bob apply the following steps on |HˆALS | and
|HˆALS |.
for i = 1: length(|HˆALS |) do
if |HˆLS | > γg then
S[i] = i
else
S[i] = 0
end if
end for
Both Alice and Bob estimate JAg = SAg [i+ 1]− SAg [i] and
JBg = S
B
g [i+ 1]− SBg [i].
Step 2: Uniform Quantization
Alice and Bob use nq to quantize JAg and JBg .
Alice and Bon convert their quantized values into bit-
streams.
Step 3: Information Reconciliation
Alice and Bob permute the bit stream and divide them into
small blocks.
Alice sends the permutation and parities to Bob.
Bob compares the received parity information with his own.
In case of mismatch, Bob corrects his bits accordingly.
Step 4: Privacy Amplification
Alice sends the number of the hash function to Bob.
Alice and Bob apply the hash function to the bit stream.
Our combined vectors are given by:
JAc = [J
A
g [1], J
A
p [1], J
A
g [2], J
A
p [2], ..., J
A
g [N ], J
A
p [N ]], (12)
JBc = [J
B
g [1], J
B
p [1], J
B
g [2], J
B
p [2], ..., J
B
g [N ], J
B
p [N ]]. (13)
To show the effect of our proposed SRP technique on the
BMR, we simulate all techniques up to the quantization and
bitstream generation step. For a fair comparison, the level
crossing technique is simulated without the information recon-
ciliation step. In other words, channel estimates at the locations
LA at both Alice and Bob are quantized and converted into
bitstreams.
A. SRP
In Figure 2-(a), we plot the estimated channel gain at both
Alice and Bob, for SNR = 20 dB and the thresholds estimated
from (8) and (9). We then follow the steps in Section IV-A to
estimate JAg and JBg and plot them in Figure 2-(b). Our SRP is
similar to a Gaussian random process with linearly increasing
variance.
B. BMR
We plot the BMR between the secret keys generated at Alice
and Bob for all the techniques in Figure 3. Our proposed SRP
techniques drastically improve the BMR achieving a BMR
that is ranging from 10-15% at low and high SNR levels to
25% at medium SNR levels less than that of the conventional
channel gain and phase. In addition to that our proposed SRP is
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Fig. 2: (a) Estimated channel gain at Alice and Bob with γAg
and γBg and (b) our estimated JA and JB .
achieving a BMR that is ranging from 12% at low SNR levels
to 40% at medium and high SNR levels less than that of the
level crossing technique. It is worth noting that on average
the worst BMR achieved is 0.5 which is equivalent to random
guessing. The level crossing is performing worst achieving the
highest BMR, which indicates that the strength of the level
crossing algorithm derives from the information reconciliation
step. The combined SRP technique achieves a BMR that is
average between the SRP channel gain and phase. Also, as
expected, as the SNR increases, the BMR for all techniques
improves.
C. Entropy
Entropy is a measure of level of randomness of the gener-
ated key. For example, for our SRP channel gain, the entropy
of a secret key generated from Alice’s estimated channel gain
is defined as H(JAg ) = log
(
1/f(JAg )
)
with f(.) denoting
the probability mass function. The average entropy is then
E[H(JAg )]. As expected from Figure 2-(b), the average entropy
of our SRP secret key will be less than that of the channel
gain. We plot the achieved average entropy of all techniques in
Figure 4. Our SRP channel gain and phase exhibit less entropy
than all other techniques. That was the motivation behind
proposing combined SRP technique - than our benchmark
techniques. Also, it is worth nothing that the combined SRP
technique does not increase the complexity of the system
since both channel gain and phase can be calculated from the
channel estimates. In addition to that, it only requires a simple
concatenation operation.
D. Key Length
Figure 5 shows the simulated key length of all techniques
normalized to the length of the secret key generated through
the conventional channel gain technique. Our proposed SRP
channel gain and phase is achieving approximately the same
key length as of that of the channel gain and phase techniques,
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Fig. 3: BMR as a function of SNR for our scheme vs. existing
techniques.
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Fig. 5: Normalized key length as a function of SNR for our
scheme vs. existing techniques.
while SRP combined is achieving twice that length. On the
contrary, the level crossing technique is performing the worst
achieving a normalized key length of 30%. This implies that
for the level crossing rate technique to achieve a reasonable
key length, the frequency of channel propping should increase
which decreases the throughput of the system.
E. Secrecy Rate
Since our generated SRPs are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.), our secret key rate after the information rec-
onciliation and privacy amplification exhibit the same results
presented in [18]. For example, the upper and lower bounds
for the channel gain SRP are given by:
RUg (J
A
g ; J
B
g ||JEg ) ≤ min
[
I(JAg ; J
B
g ), I(J
A
g ; J
B
g |JEg )
]
, (14)
RLg (J
A
g ; J
B
g ||JEg ) ≥ max[I(JBg ; JAg )
− I(JEg ; JAg ), I(JAg ; JBg )− I(JEg ; JBg )],
(15)
where I(JAg ; JBg ) is the mutual information between JAg and
JBg and I(JAg ; JBg |JEg ) is the mutual information between JAg
and JBg given JEg for the eavesdropper Eve. The supremum of
the secret key rate is considered the secret key capacity Cg:
Cg = max
PJAg
S(JAg ; J
B
g ||JEg )
≤ min
[
max
PJAg
I(JAg ; J
B
g ),max
PJAg
I(JAg ; J
B
g |JEg )
]
(16)
where PJAg is the probability density function of J
A
g .
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a simple yet robust technique to extract a
secret key from a secondary random process that is derived
from the channel estimates. We showed that our SRP technique
can be applied on the channel gain only, channel phase only as
well as a combination of the two. We simulated our technique
using a complete OFDM system and compared its performance
to existing techniques. Our SPR techniques provided a drastic
improve in the BMR, and achieved comparable entropy and a
much longer key length in the case of the combined SRPs. In
addition, our SRP solution is easy to implement and does not
increase the complexity of the system.
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